Publications
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The U.S.‐Caribbean Shared Security Partnership: Responding to the Growth of Trafficking and Narcotics in the Caribbean
Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Drug trafficking routes and networks are like water running downhill, they will always seek the path of least resistance. And, like a balloon, when pressure is applied in one area the displaced operations pop up in another. The $139 million, two-year Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), in anticipation of the pressure being applied in Mexico and Colombia, is aimed at making it simultaneously more difficult to traffic cocaine and other illicit drugs through the Caribbean. But there are several significant roadblocks for the CBSI achieving its goals, in addition to the traditional issues of corruption, weak institutions, lack of rule of law, and lack of resources to fight traffickers who are well-resourced. and have multiple unguarded points of entry across the region. They cannot be addressed outside of the broader regional context of Latin America. The two most significant roadblocks are: the growing political and economic influence of Venezuela in the region; and the continuing existence of large offshore financial centers offering multiple services to a broad array of transnational criminal organizations.
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Air Sea Battle (China + Allies) Threat Projections:Thinking In and Outside the Box
For the National Defense University Program: Strategies for Defeating Anti-Access/Area Denial Capabilities, IASC Fellow Richard Fisher provides a briefing that examines key “hardware” trends for air-sea battles in East Asia. Importantly, the review of China’s threat potential considers the capabilities China could bring to bear over the next two to three decades, both inside the East Asian “box” and well outside that box.
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Military Space Ambitions of the People’s Republic of China and How Near Term PRC-U.S. Cooperation with China In Outer Space Could Threaten U.S. Interests
Testimony before United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee It is highly questionable whether the United States and the PRC can find a basis for cooperation in space that would then cause a fundamentally positive change to their relations here on Earth. As with the former Soviet Union, any real change in PRC relations with the U.S. will depend far more on a transformation away from the current Communist Party dictatorship and its military guarantors toward an open, accountable democratic system. The PRC Party-Military amalgam depends on domestic repression and recurrent reference to so-called external threats to remain in power. In fact, we see each of these escalating dangerously of late, leading to notable expressions of concern from its neighbors, this Congress and indeed this Administration. In such a context there is little NASA can do to effect positive change -- whilst conversely, it could do a great deal of harm to U.S. interests if it were to continue to enable the PRC to extract one-sided advantage from U.S. science and space technologies.
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Asymmetric Options for the Defense of Taiwan: U.S. Missile Technology
Briefing for IASC Congressional Forum: Is Taiwan Defendable? Over the medium to long run the democratic government in Taiwan will not be able to purchase or afford the weapons necessary to deter military attack or coercion by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), forcing political concessions that could lead to an end to Taiwan’s democratic era. At the same time, the United States will find itself increasingly constrained in ability to deter Chinese attack or coercion, both by its reductions in military growth compared to that of the PLA, and its unwillingness to risk conflict with the PRC over the sale of larger and more weapons to Taiwan. Following Taiwan’s decision over a decade ago to seek new “asymmetric” deterrent means, like new precision attack missiles, the U.S. appears to be warming to the idea of assisting Taiwan in pursuing “asymmetric” capabilities. Though this “reappraisal” has not been fully explained, there may be an opportunity to shape its content.
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China’s Maturing Fighter Force
Following an intensive twenty year investment, which has included obtaining significant foreign help, the air forces of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have reached a number of milestones that point to the likelihood of an accelerating growth in capability through this decade. Perhaps one of the most jarring indicators of this rapid maturation is that within five years of the reported retiring of its last 2nd generation fighter unit of Shenyang J-6s in 2005, the PLA started testing prototypes of its 5th generation Chengdu “J-20” in 2010. Furthermore, less than a decade following the 2004 service entry of the “indigenous” 4th generation Chengdu J-10 fighter, a new 4+ generation variant called the “J-10B” is expected to enter production in late 2011 or 2012. It has taken the PLA roughly 20 years to leap from production of third generation fighters to testing of its 5th generation fighter, whereas this process took 30 years for the United States.
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