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Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance?
Senior Fellow Douglas Farah's analysis of the debate over the level of threat posed by Iran's expanding diplomatic, trade and military presence in Latin America, and its stated ambition to continue to broaden these ties.
Chinese Naval Modernization: Altering the Balance of Power
Richard Fisher details China's naval modernization program and the potential impacts on U.S. interests in the Western Pacific.
China's 'Power Projection'
Wall Street Journal
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Just a year ago at the Shangri-La Conference in Singapore, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked, "Since no nation threatens China, one wonders: Why this growing investment? . . . Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?" The question was rhetorical -- because the answer is plain. China's accumulating military capabilities are decisively shifting the balance of military power in Asia, threatening American friends and allies from Japan to India -- and most seriously Taiwan. The buildup in the Taiwan Strait is raising the risk of war, giving China new tools to attack American forces if they defend the island, and laying foundations for future "power projection" capabilities that could limit American strategic options within the next decade.
China spends far more on its military than any other country in Asia. The Pentagon estimates China's true defense spending is two to three times this year's official military budget of $35 billion -- putting it in the range of $70 to $105 billion. Tokyo's $46.5 billion defense budget pales by comparison, providing one more reason why Japanese officials identify China as a threat.
This growing military buildup is having an impact. Just compare China's failed attempts to intimidate Taiwan a decade ago with its ability to take the island today. In 1996, military exercises by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) off the coast of Taiwan failed to deter islanders from decisively electing President Lee Teng-hui, whom Beijing accused of harboring pro-independence sentiments. That was, in part, because the PLA was then too weak to constitute a credible threat. Its army-dominated high command was unable even to coordinate the 1996 maneuvers with Chinese marines, air and naval forces, while its most modern Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighters used old-fashioned non-precision-guided "dumb" bombs. No one took seriously the idea of a naval blockade, let alone an amphibious invasion, especially after the PLA was humiliated by its inability to match President Bill Clinton's deployment of two U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan.
Now fast forward to last August, when the PLA staged sophisticated war games with its Russian counterparts for the first time since the Communist revolution, under the double-edged title of "Peace Mission 2005." This time, Chinese army, marine, air and naval forces had no problem coordinating their maneuvers, not just with each other, but also with their Russian counterparts. PLA air-force fighters conducted exercises with information provided by Russian A-50 AWACS surveillance aircraft, while PLA and Russian navy units staged joint anti-ship, air defense and anti-submarine operations. The final stage of the exercise showed just how much China has improved its amphibious landing capabilities over the past decade. PLA army and marine units, assisted by airborne troops, linked up with their Russian counterparts to simulate an opposed shore landing of the type expected to form part of any invasion of Taiwan.
Admittedly, the level of coordination between the various forces during this exercise fell far short of the way American forces work so seamlessly together in joint operations. But that should not obscure the point that, in the space of a decade, the PLA has begun an IT-centered transformation that closely follows the U.S. model.
The threat posed by this transformation is enhanced by the increasing array of forces threatening Taiwan today. Since 2000, the PLA navy has doubled its capacity to transport assault troops to around 35 large ships, and by 2010 its air force is likely to receive approximately 30 new Il-76 transport planes ordered from Russia last year. These new ships and planes will make it easier for Chinese forces to capture vital ports and airfields in Taiwan in the event of an invasion. The air force's 150 fighter bombers, which would play a critical role in destroying targets in Taiwan, are expected to double in number over the next four years. And don't forget the more than 800 missiles that China has targeted at the island -- a number increasing by at least 100 a year.
These forces are arrayed against an island still stalling on upgrading its defenses. Manipulated by Beijing's united-front tactics, the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) has sabotaged efforts to modernize Taiwan's military. For the past two years, together with like-minded allies, the KMT has used its majority in the island's legislature to block the special budget needed to pay for the package of defensive weapons that U.S. President George Bush offered Taiwan in 2001. As a result, there now seems little prospect of Taiwan ever getting the missile-defense system and eight new submarines that President Bush offered as part of that package. All it has been able to purchase so far are four used U.S. air-defense destroyer warships used to improve the Taiwan navy's air-defense capabilities. These were purchased before the KMT and its allies took control of the legislature in 2004.
If the U.S. ever had to come to Taiwan's defense again, it would face a PLA navy far better equipped to threaten its aircraft carriers than in 1996. This year, China will acquire its tenth new air-defense destroyer since 1999, and take delivery of eight new Russian submarines armed with modern anti-ship missiles. By 2010, the PLA is expected to have anti-ship ballistic missiles with a range of at least 1,000 miles -- missiles which the U.S. Navy is ill-equipped to intercept. America might also face nuclear blackmail. By 2010, China is also likely to add up to 100 land-based and 24 submarine-based missiles armed with nuclear warheads, more than enough to overwhelm planned U.S. missile defenses. Last year, a PLA general threatened to launch nuclear missiles against hundreds of American cities in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.
China is also beginning to project its power further afield. It's no coincidence that last year's war games were officially held under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a Sino-Russian led group that also includes four Central Asian states as members. That telegraphs Beijing and Moscow's intention to build up this body as a competitor to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Some Chinese scholars are already suggesting that since Iran has observer status in the SCO, the group should step in to support Tehran against the growing Western pressure over its nuclear program. With Pakistan, also currently an observer in the SCO and lobbying for full membership, it is not unrealistic to foresee that future war games might see Chinese forces exercising alongside their counterparts from this crucial American ally in the war on terror.
This will be made possible by China's current investment in new power projection forces, including aircraft carriers and planes capable of carrying its troops far further. Beijing already has one modern aircraft carrier, the Soviet-made Varyag, which China purchased from Ukraine in 2002 and is refurbishing in Dalian harbor. Over the past year, it has been reported that Russia is willing to help China design and arm a second such aircraft carrier. Sources in Kiev say Ukraine is also ready to help China build military planes the size of the U.S. C-17 and the even larger C-5. These would give China the capacity to transport larger troop formations and their supporting armor, since each C-5 plane can carry the equivalent of 150 tons of cargo.
The Bush administration has begun responding to the Chinese threat by shifting more forces to Asia, including submarines and aircraft carriers. It is also stepping up military cooperation with Japan, and is in the early stages of forging a new partnership with India, which might eventually extend to strategic issues. Washington has also been pleading with Beijing to become a "responsible stakeholder" in global affairs. But as their military power increases, Chinese leaders may soon be as blunt as the Singapore's Straits Times, which in a March 23 editorial told Americans to stop "hectoring" and "make space" for China's military power. That is particularly ominous because it suggests that even American allies, like Singapore, may begin to respond to China's growing might with appeasement -- a development which would only embolden China to further accelerate its military buildup. There is little to suggest then that China will reduce its threats toward Taiwan, end its hostility toward Japan, or alter its support for tyranny in North Korea and Iran.
Mr. Fisher is a vice president of the International Assessment and Strategy Center, a Virginia-based think tank focusing on international security issues.
