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Multilateralism Shanghaied

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by Mohan Malik
Published on July 14th, 2006
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Confronted with a dramatic expansion of the U.S. military power ("hard power") all around China’s periphery post-9/11, Beijing has responded by unveiling its "soft power" strategy in the form of a diplomatic "charm offensive", the notion of "China’s peaceful rise," and laid greater emphasis on economic integration and multilateralism. While calling for an end to the Cold War-era U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand, China has stepped up its own efforts to establish a worldwide "Coalition of Autocracies" with Russia, North Korea, Cambodia, Burma, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Uzbekistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Angola, Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela—albeit under the rubric of economic interdependence and globalization.

With the U.S. bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, Beijing has been busy carving out a large sphere of influence for itself by seeking to subdue Japan and Taiwan, and weaken U.S.-South Korean alliance in Northeast Asia; by skillfully using multilateralism and economic diplomacy to establish a pro-China regional order in Southeast Asia; by strengthening Beijing’s military alliances with Pakistan, Burma and Bangladesh in South Asia to contain India and gain access to the Indian Ocean so as to secure trade routes and energy resources; and by making significant inroads in the South Pacific under the cover of a China-Taiwan contest for diplomatic recognition. In fact, courting the strategically-located, resource-rich but isolated and turbulent countries run by authoritarian leaders and fishing in troubled waters, while simultaneously chanting the mantra of "non-interference in domestic affairs" and "peace and development", have long been the key characteristics of Chinese foreign policy. More importantly, China is now increasingly relying upon multilateral organizations to define limits to the U.S. global power, marginalize Japan, Taiwan, and India, and have its foreign policy agenda endorsed by or imposed on global and regional organizations.

In this context, regional multilateral organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have lately come to occupy an important place in China’s grand strategy. The six-nation SCO is a Beijing-led and-dominated regional multilateral security forum, which comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. (India has observer status along with Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia.) It is successor to the Shanghai Five grouping put together in 1996 to deal with China’s border disputes with former Soviet Central Asian republics, which has slowly expanded its reach into counterterrorism, defense, energy and economic cooperation. With the decline of Moscow’s influence, Beijing has sought to rely primarily on the SCO as an instrument to project its power and gain allies in a region which is source of much needed strategic energy resources as well as a launch-pad for China’s larger strategic aspirations in Central and Southwest Asia. Through the SCO, Beijing has also sought to secure its western frontier by creating a buffer for restive Xinjiang province, contain the forces of "separatism, terrorism and extremism," and most importantly, counter the U.S. presence in the region. Beijing’s task is made easier by the fact that the SCO is devoid of any democratic and liberal values. As elsewhere, "the successful Chinese model" of "development-minus-democracy" or "development-before-democracy" is now being sold to the Central Asians as an alternative model for ending poverty, and it resonates well across the region.

That China is using regional multilateral forums to endorse Beijing’s foreign policy agenda is evident from its success in having the SCO pass a resolution opposing UN Security Council reforms at its June 2006 summit. The resolution stated that "[n]o time limit should be set for the reform, nor should a vote be forced on any proposal over which there are major differences." The SCO declaration is an endorsement of the stance taken earlier by China on this issue, and is an attempt to pre-empt aspirations of the "Group-of-Four" (Japan, India, Germany, and Brazil), also known in Beijing as the "Gang-of-Four", who are bidding for permanent seats in Security Council. Interestingly, the Chinese are now the strongest champions of the status quo and reject anything that might reduce their power or influence in the UN Security Council.

Another sign of Beijing’s geo-strategic designs is the Chinese proposal made at the June 2006 SCO summit to sign a long-term Treaty on Peace and Cooperation that would effectively turn the SCO into a Eurasian collective defense organization along the lines of NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). This Chinese move coupled with the call made by the SCO at its 2005 summit to set a timetable for closing down foreign military bases in Central Asia has aroused concern in Washington and other capitals that the China-dominated regional grouping could be positioning itself as a military bloc. Soon thereafter, Uzbekistan closed down the U.S. base. Kyrgyzstan is now the only Central Asian country to host U.S. forces. Likewise, India’s military base in Tajikistan is an eyesore to the Chinese.

Significantly, Pakistan and Iran are clamoring for full membership of the SCO. As an inducement, Pakistan’s Musharraf has offered "an energy corridor and access to warm waters (Arabian Sea and the Gulf)" to China, Russia, and the landlocked Central Asian member states of the SCO, while Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, finding himself in the doghouse internationally, has offered oil and gas in exchange for backing for Teheran’s nuclear program. Ahmadinejad’s plea "to turn the SCO into a strong, influential institution" with the capacity to "throw out the threats of domineering powers to interfere in the affairs of other states" (read, the United Sates) was indeed music to Hu Jintao’s ears. However, smaller Central Asian states are not keen on Iran’s full membership, partly for fear of incurring Washington’s wrath. As for Pakistan, all SCO members—of course, with the sole exception of China—remain wary of having a major sponsor of Islamic terrorism and nuclear proliferation in their midst.

At the June 2006 SCO summit, while every other member and observer was represented by its head of state, India chose to send its Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Murli Deora, sparking speculation that New Delhi did not want to antagonize Washington—which sees the SCO as an attempt to forge a rival power center—at a time when the U.S.-India nuclear deal is under consideration in the U.S. Congress. As New Delhi seeks to develop stronger economic and strategic ties with Washington, it is apparently wary of being seen in Beijing’s camp. Moreover, India has not forgotten the SCO’s rejection of the "Group-of-Four" formula for UN Security Council expansion in 2005, and the disqualification of the OVL-Mittal bid for PetroKazakhstan last year, both under pressure from the Chinese.

While China wants the SCO "to become as familiar as acronyms such as NATO and ASEAN," Russia’s Putin and Iran’s Ahmadinejad have also floated the idea of an "SCO Energy Club", inviting criticism over the possible emergence of an "energy cartel" or "energy hegemony". It is noteworthy that Iran is now the third-biggest supplier of oil to China. Recently, Hong Kong-based Takungpao News quoted General Xiong Guangkai, the former PLA deputy chief of staff, as saying that "in the long term, the strategic race for the world’s energy may result in regional tension and even trigger a military clash." Although the SCO refutes the charge of striving to be "NATO of the East", some observers believe that its security agenda and joint military exercises indicate otherwise. After "Peace Mission 2005", the SCO is planning another giant military exercise in Russia in 2007, possibly with Iranian participation. Others, however, contend that Central Asia remains prone to internal and external fissures. There are too many contradictions and geopolitical fault lines in the Eurasian heartland to allow for the formation of a NATO-like military alliance. In addition to U.S.-China rivalry over security and energy, there exist similar undercurrents between Russia and China, China and India, and China and Japan.

For smaller Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), the competition among great powers for influence and energy supplies presents an attractive opportunity to wrest more generous benefits, whether in aid, security guarantees or energy investments. However, they remain wary of the power plays of China, the United States, Iran, India, Pakistan, and Russia. Most Central Asians do not want to replace Soviet domination with Chinese domination over their countries. Post-9/11, each Central Asian state struck unilateral deal with the U.S. based on its own self-interest, thereby allowing Washington to establish a strategic foothold in Central Asia. They have also sought to promote substantive energy and military cooperation with Washington. Kazakhstan, for example, has contributed troops to Iraq and is seeking closer partnership with NATO. Much to Beijing’s disappointment, some SCO members continue to provide military bases to the United States and India, and remain receptive to overtures from Japan. Besides, Central Asia’s local ethnic, religious rivalries and conflicting interests present formidable obstacles to Beijing’s desire to knit the region’s governments into a solid security partnership to further China’s grand strategic objectives. For Central Asians, their ties with the U.S., Japan, India and others provide them with leverage to lessen the overbearing influence of their neighboring giants (China and Russia). They view the U.S. presence in the region as an insurance policy against any future bid by China and Russia to reassert control. Reports suggest that the U.S. is planning to create its own "Greater Central Asia" initiative a grouping of countries friendly to American policy that will serve as a counterweight to the SCO.

In short, the SCO means different things to different countries. For some, it is a new "energy cartel" with more than 20% of the world’s oil and gas resources. To others, it is "an anti-U.S. alliance". In fact, many see it as "an autocrats’ club" whose leaders fear their own people more than external forces. Most tend to dismiss it as yet another inconsequential "talk shop" of countries with conflicting interests. While courting Central Asia, other major powers need to remain vigilant about Beijing’s geopolitical machinations. Major energy-dependent democratic economies (the United States, Japan, India, South Korea, and Taiwan) need to chalk out a common strategy to foil China’s attempts to "lock up" oil, gas and mineral supplies for Beijing’s exclusive use in Central Asia, Russia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Beijing’s new-found love for multilateralism is nothing but a smokescreen for its strategic expansion designs. Multilateralism is a multi-player game played in a spirit of give-and-take. Authoritarian regimes like China’s that do not share power at home, and accept no institutional constraints on the exercise of power in domestic politics are unlikely to respect the rights and interests of others in international politics. With the United States preoccupied with the war on terror, a confident and assertive China is busy steering regional and global multilateralism along the lines of the SCO to serve Beijing’s strategic expansion goals and weaken the power and influence of its perceived competitors and rivals. As in many other parts of the developing world, under the cover of multilateral diplomacy, China is redrawing geopolitical alliances in ways that help propel China’s rise as a global superpower.

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