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Terrorism in Africa

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by Douglas Farah
Published on January 16th, 2007
ARTICLES

The decision by the Pentagon to create a separate Africa Command is the clearest indication to date that the U.S. military and other branches of the U.S. government view sub-Saharan Africa as a growing Islamist terrorist threat.^[1] Responsibility for the continent has, for decades, been the responsibility of three separate unified commands: the European Command; Central Command; and the Pacific Command.

Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), who has been involved in Africa policy of more than a decade, summarized the resulting situation as follows: "The core function of a combatant command is to plan for military contingencies in the region. Yet Central Command has its hands full fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan-and watching Iran. While the European Command has been increasing its Africa activities, its key focus has followed the eastward expansion of NATO. The Pacific Command, meanwhile, is headquartered more than 10,000 miles from Madagascar. These commands are challenged to closely monitor Africa's troubled states and vast ungoverned areas."^[2]

The decision to form a separate command was driven in large part by the realization that the fragmented nature of the U.S. military intelligence gathering and regional security training efforts were failing to meet the growing threat posed by expanding Islamist networks in East and Southern Africa, the strong presence of radical Islamist groups in Somalia -- and the growing presence of Iranian-backed groups tied to Hezbollah, at times cooperating with al Qaeda, in West Africa.^[3]

The simple geographic size of the sub-Saharan Africa (larger than the United States, Europe, India and China combined), is daunting. The region is comprised of 49 countries with a total population of 725 million. Among those nations are 34 of the world’s poorest states^[4], even as Africa exports roughly as much oil to the U.S. as does the Persian Gulf and has large oil and gas reserves. Much of the subcontinent has a strong, traditional Islamic presence, and the mosaic of cultures, beliefs and societal structures is little understood and varies widely within and among regions. These factors combine to present a significant set of challenges for intelligence gathering and long-term policy goals, even for a single unified command. The fragmentation of the command, said one senior U.S. official at the European Command, has meant that "we had a trickle of intelligence that is broad but only a centimeter deep. We know lots of things, but we also don’t really know anything."^[5]

Under the current structure, the European Command is running counter-terror programs in the Pan-Sahel region of West Africa from its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. There is little coordination with the Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (JTF-HOA) under Central Command, operating from Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. The JTF was established in December 2002 to "detect, disrupt and defeat terrorists who pose an imminent threat to coalition partners in the region. It also works with host nations to deny the reemergence of terrorist cells and activities by supporting international agencies working to enhance long-term stability for the region."^[6]

David Radcliffe, regional director for Africa in the office of the Secretary of Defense, noted recently that terrorist groups "need the space to train, they need the space to operate, and they need the space to recruit. They need a refuge they can go to with reasonable certainty that they are not going to be targeted by military forces." Because sub-Saharan Africa offers these advantages, many areas are attractive to terrorist groups, he said.^[7]

The Islamist groups are keenly aware of the advantages offered by large sections of Africa, and are seeking to exploit them. An extensive essay in the June issue of Sada al-Jihad (Echo of Jihad), an on-line magazine supporting global jihad, specifically outlines al Qaeda's growing interest in expanding into sub-Saharan Africa and the reasons the region presents opportunity for Islamist activities. Among those listed are: the general weakness of central governments and corruption, making it easier to operate in Africa than "in other countries which have effective security, intelligence and military capacities."^[8]

Further complicating the strategic situation in the continent are the vast cultural and ethnic differences across geographic boundaries, and the competing (and sometimes cooperating) interests of different Islamist groups with different goals, strengths and weaknesses.

For example, the al Qaeda-linked Sunni Islamist groups present a separate threat from the radical Shi’ite groups tied to Lebanon and Hezbollah through family and business networks. This distinction is often not clearly made although it is important because the primary aims of the two groups are different.

The Shi’ite infrastructure is being bolstered by the interest and capability of Iran to expand its economic reach into Africa.^[9] The primary function the Shi’ite groups is to collect funds through taxes on Lebanese-owned diamond and retail businesses, extortion and voluntary contributions that can be used to finance Hezbollah.^[10] Each year an estimated $200 million is collected from the Lebanese diasporas in Africa and the Tri-Border Area of Latin America, with about half of that amount coming from Africa.^[11]

The benefits for Iran are numerous, in addition to access to important strategic mineral deposits. As Iran faces growing isolation in Europe and the West, Africa offers a ready market not only for the export of ideology and religion, but of weapons and other Iranian goods. Among its primary clients are Nigeria, Senegal, Zimbabwe and South Africa.^[12]

The Sunni-Salafist groups, in contrast, are seeking to build a network of like-mined jihadist groups to join the struggle to establish an Islamist caliphate, or land ruled by Muslims under strict Islamic sharia law. This Salafist theology is being spread with both official approval and funding of several Gulf states. Saudi Arabia has been investing millions of dollars in recent years in the building of Salafist mosques, often staffed by imams who repudiate the traditional, more tolerant Sufi versions of Islam historically practiced in much of Africa.

As a recent private intelligence study on Islam in Africa noted, "the generally pacific, syncretistic African Islam is being swept aside by a militant Islamism imported from the Middle East that is not only transforming local societies, but also threatening to turn an increasingly significant region into an environment hospitable to extremist violence – with reverberations that will be felt throughout the continent and beyond."^[13]

The Gulf-financed expansion of Salafist movements in Africa has been accompanied by several other notable developments. One little-explored precursor of radical Islam’s growth has been the expanding influence of the Tablighi Jamaat, a network of itinerant Islamist imams and workers, usually from Pakistan where the group originated in the 1920’s, or the Middle East, who travel to local mosques to preach and go house to house in order to call Muslims to return to the true faith.

There is little hard data available on the group, which provides almost no information on itself or its activities. Yet reports from intelligence groups, NGOs and academics all suggest the Tablighi movement has expanded significantly in Africa. While claiming to be non-political and peaceful, U.S. and European intelligence officials monitoring Islamist movements say the group’s recruits often move from the Tablighi movement to violent Islamist extremism. Among those first recruited by the Tablighis were John Walker Lindh, the "American Taliban;" members of the Lackawanna Six, Jose Padilla, being held as an enemy combatant for allegedly attempting to buy elements for a "dirty bomb; and Richard Reid (the shoe bomber).^[14]

Farad Esack, a South African Islamic scholar who says he spent 12 years with the group in Pakistan, recounted in the New York Times a favorite Tablighi Jamaat analogy that equates individual Muslims to the electricians who work to light up a village. Each person lays wire until one day, the mayor comes to switch on the lights. "For many people in Tablighi Jamaat," he said, "the Taliban represented God switching the lights on."^[15]

The Tablighi movement has been particularly active in the West African nations of Mali and Mauritania, and there are credible reports of extensive and growing networks. While not directly linked to Islamist violence in the region, the potential for recruitment through this group remains strong.^[16]

There are also credible reports of Tablighi leaders being tied to violent Islamist groups in Uganda, particularly the Allied Democratic Front (ADF). The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) found in late 2006 that the ADF "is an alliance of at least three rebel groups, including the remnants of the secessionist Rwenzuru movement, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda, and extremist elements from the Tabliqi Muslim community. The ADF, which decided to adopt radical Islam as its ideology, was born from a core group of puritanical Muslims from the Tabliqi sect, whose members portray themselves as ‘Muslim evangelists.’"^[17]

At a minimum, the Tablighi network shares, along with other Islamist groups, the desire to recreate the Caliphate. Al Qaeda leadership, in public statements have also been explicit in stating their desire to occupy territory in Africa as one step in establishing the Caliphate, kingdom of Allah on earth, ruled under strict sharia law.

The centrality to Islamists of this concept of territorial occupation is borne out in numerous statements by al Qaeda leaders and affiliated or like-minded groups. In his Dec. 20, 2006 statement broadcast on the al Jazeera network, Bin Laden deputy Ayman Zawahiri repeatedly returned to the theme of the establishment of the physical caliphate.^[18]

The key battleground of this war for Africa is currently viewed as Somalia, a country roughly the size of Texas with a population of about 9 million that sits at a strategic crossroads between Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan and Africa. For the past seven months the radical Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had controlled most of the country. The internationally-recognized government, backed by Ethiopian troops, firepower and air power, drove the Islamist forces from most of Somalia’s cities and towns between Christmas and New Years, leaving the Islamist forces on the run and in some disarray.

However, the situation is likely to remain volatile, given the history of Somalia, the long-standing interest of al Qaeda and its allies in opening another war front in what the Islamist view as a battle between true Muslims and the Jewish/Christian Crusaders, and the amount of weapons the ICU was able to bring in while in control of key airports and ports.

Osama bin Laden, in a July 2 statement, took pains to single out Somalia as an important jihadist front, and promised full support should anyone seek to attack the ICU.^[19] In his statement of Dec. 22, bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman Zawahiri also directly addressed the ICU in Somalia as follows, elevating the defense of the movement to a strategic imperative:

Brothers in Islam and Jihad in Somalia: know that you are on the southern garrison of Islam, so don’t allow Islam to be attacked from your flank, and know that we are with you, and that the entire Muslim Ummah is with you. "So don’t lose heart, or fall into despair, for you must dominate if you are true in faith." (3:139) And know that you are fending off the same Crusade which is fighting your brothers in Islam in Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. So be resolute, be patient and be optimistic, for by Allah beside whom there is no other god, even if your enemies possess thousands of tons of iron and explosives, in their chests lie the hearts of mice.^[20]

The recent acquisitions by the ICU were outlined starkly in an October report to the United Nations Security Council, which detailed some of the aid the Islamist forces were receiving from Saudi Arabia, Eritrea and other nations. It stated that the ICU’s military buildup included the acquisition of surface-to-air missiles, vehicles with mobile weapons platforms, and the arrival of volunteers from foreign countries who were establishing training camps and conducting sophisticated training.^[21]

Given that sophisticated military arsenal, and the presence of foreign fighters now in and around Somalia, it is unlikely the war will simply ebb away, despite triumphant statements by senior Somali officials. In early January Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi said his forces, backed by Ethiopia, had neutralized the Islamists and forced them to give up or scatter into the bush. He said he does not expect any more major fighting.^[22] The Islamists, in turn, responded, "If the world thinks we are dead, they should know we are alive. We will rise from the ashes."^[23]

Outside analysts said there was reason for pessimism, noting that the situation in Somalia has been badly misread in the past, particularly regarding the roles of the clan, family and sub-clan structures that govern Somali life. In 1993 the U.S. military and intelligence community failed to understand the situation the troops on the ground were facing, leading to the infamous "Black Hawk Down" incident, wherein the bodies of dead U.S. Rangers were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. As one analyst noted: "Because of this disdain for the Somali tribal group as a military organization, the United States underestimated Somali capacity to adapt to and fight effectively in the urban environment of Mogadishu. Disaster followed."^[24] This has been a pattern not only in Somalia, but across much of Africa.

U.S. intelligence officials monitoring the situation in the Horn of Africa said the U.S. intelligence community was largely unprepared for the initial triumph of the ICU in Somalia, believing that U.S.-backed groups would be able to provide an effective counter to the Islamists. However, the brutality and impunity with which the U.S.-backed forces operated made the ICU, with its promises of law and order seem more appealing. In the event. The ICU’s promises, which they implemented quickly and effectively, were strikingly similar to the Taliban and resulted in widespread disaffection in areas under their control.

Intelligence community sources say the Pentagon has more intelligence resources in Africa than any other member of the community because it has personnel in most countries and joint training exercises that open doors in many places which other members of the community cannot open. Yet much of the information developed on the Somali situation – and the rest of Africa -- by the U.S. military has received little attention from the various commands which different intelligence gatherers and analysts report to, according to military sources. As a result, even with good collection, policy decisions are long delayed and there is little attention focused from either military or civilian principals on Africa issues.

Military officials said that a single command that was able to look at all the information from the different areas of interest, from Somalia to Liberia to South Africa, would be in a better position to avoid another surprise such as the ICU takeover of Somalia. As both the Salafist jihadists and Iranian-backed Shi’ite groups such as Hezbollah target Africa for a variety of reasons—all of them hostile to U.S interests and the long-term interests the African nations they target—understanding the enemy will become increasingly vital.

Al Qaeda has publicly expressed its intention to expand in Africa, and Hezbollah has already developed a sophisticated and deeply-embedded financial infrastructure in many countries. The Tablighi network and other forces of radicalization are already scattered across the continent and have the financial and human resources to continue their efforts in conditions that favor the reception of their message. Those are among the formidable challenges that we know of. There are likely many more that we do not yet have any inkling of. The question is whether we are prepared to fight in Africa’s multi-layered conflict, the outcome of which can seriously affect us, despite its seeming remoteness.

---

^[1] www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/14/AR2006121401005.html

^[2] Ed Royce, "Africa: A Pentagon Imperative," The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 14, 2006, accessible at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1114/p09s02-coop.html

^[3] Author interviews with DOD officials.

^[4] Data compiled from the 2006 Population Reference Bureau, accessible at: http://www.prb.org/pdf06/06WorldDataSheet.pdf

^[5] Author interviews with DOD officials.

^[6]J FT-HOA Mission Statement, viewable at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/cjtf-hoa.htm

^[7] www.news24.com/News24/Africa/News/0,,2-11-1447_1990145,00.html

^[8] The article was translated by the Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) and discussed in: Reuven Paz and Mose Terdman, "Africa, the Gold Mine of AL Qaeda and Global Jihad," PRISM Occasional Paper, Volume 4, Number 2, June 2006.

^[9] See for example the recent trip of Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe to Iran in search of $200 million in investment and aid for his collapsing economy: www.africa-interactive.net/index.php?PageID=2311. For an account of the January 2005 meeting of the Iran-Africa Cooperation Committee, see: www.iran-daily.com/1383/2189/html/focus.htm

^[10] For a fuller discussion of the Lebanese connection, including that of Hezbollah and the Amal militia, please see: Lansana Gberie, War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection, The Diamond and Human Security Project, Occasional Paper 6, January 2003.

^[11] Author interviews with DOD personnel.

^[12] For a discussion of Iranian weapons sales to Nigeria and elsewhere, see: www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2006/af_nigeria_03_24.html

^[13] Report in possession of author. For a more complete look at the impact of the Sunni-Salafist movement in West Africa, see: International Crisis Group, "Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?" Africa Report number 92, March 31, 2005.

^[14] Susan Sachs, "A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny in U.S.," The New York Times, July 14, 2003, viewed at: http://www.hvk.org/articles/0703/113.html

^[15] Susan Sachs, "A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny in U.S.," The New York Times, July 14, 2003, viewed at: http://www.hvk.org/articles/0703/113.html

^[16] International Crisis Group, "Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?" Africa Report number 92, March 31, 2005.

^[17] http://www.e-prism.org/images/Islam_in_Africa_Newsletter_-_No4_-_August06.pdf

^[18] Translation of Zawahiri’s statement taken from the Counter-Terrorism Blog: http://counterterrorismblog.org/

^[19] www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/02/binladen.message/index.html

^[20] Text of translation taken from: www.lauramansfield.com/j/zawahiri_122006.asp

^[21] Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia to the United Nations Security Council, Oct. 16, 2006, pg. 6.

^[22] Elizabeth A. Kennedy, "Somalia PM: Islamic Forces Neutralized," The Associated Press, Jan. 2, 2007, viewed at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/02/AR2007010200065.html

^[23] C. Bryson Hull and Sahal Abdulle, "Islamists Vow to "Rise From the Ashes," Reuters, Jan. 2, 2007, accessed at: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L02903953.htm

^[24] Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 100. The Somalia chapter of this book offers an insightful look at the clan and family structures in Somalia, as well as the long history of contained warfare among the groups, that helped shape the U.S. military failure in Somalia.

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