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Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance?
Senior Fellow Douglas Farah's analysis of the debate over the level of threat posed by Iran's expanding diplomatic, trade and military presence in Latin America, and its stated ambition to continue to broaden these ties.
Chinese Naval Modernization: Altering the Balance of Power
Richard Fisher details China's naval modernization program and the potential impacts on U.S. interests in the Western Pacific.
South China Sea Competition: China Contemplates More Mischief
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On June 11, 2009 a Chinese Navy submarine reportedly collided with the towed sonar array of the U.S. Navy destroyer U.S.S. John S. McCain, about 144 miles from Subic Bay in the Philippines.[1] Previously on March 8, 2009 Chinese Maritime Militia ships harassed the U.S.S. Impeccable on a surveillance mission about 75 miles from Hainan Island.[2] These incidents illustrate a growing tension between China, the United States and other Asian nations over China’s increasing militarization of the South China Sea. This region’s sea lanes are critical to Asia’s economic vitality, while the six littoral states have overlapping claims and occupy varying numbers of islets in the Paracel and Spratly Island chains. China claims most of the South China Sea as its territory and at times has sought to calm tensions by acceding to regional negotiations designed to advance economic cooperation while setting aside territorial claims, though as of yet there is no regional framework to settle conflicting claims. Furthermore, China has long claimed that provisions of the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty allow it to forbid foreign military activities within its Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ), an interpretation that Washington rejects.
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But since the mid-1970s Beijing has also pursued a slow campaign of military occupation, to include military operations against Vietnamese and Philippine areas, base construction and legal measures to assert greater control over the South China Sea. China’s reasons for doing so became clear earlier this decade when it started building its new large naval base near the resort city of Sanya on Hainan Island. This base will service some portion of China’s new second generation nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet and China apparently intends to establish defended "bastions" near Hainan to ensure the viability of its "second strike" nuclear deterrent force. According to available open sources this analyst has speculated that China could eventually place about half of its future nuclear missile force on SSBNs. This in part explains China’s increasing efforts to push back U.S. Navy attempts to monitor China’s military activities in the South China Sea.
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China has neither declared officially its strategic nuclear plans for this region, nor has it offered to engage in any consultations about the reasons for its buildup in the South China Sea, which might lead to greater transparency and mechanisms that could be used to reduce tensions. Beijing and Washington are due to discuss "incidents at sea" in July 2009 but China has previously refused signing onto a formal "incidents at sea" agreement as did the U.S. and former Soviet Union. Instead, China appears intent on building up its military strength as internal pressure mounts for bolder action. On June 18 and 19 Chinese media outlets reported on what may become a significant Chinese escalation: a recently retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department called for the construction of a formal air and naval base in the contested Mischief Reef. Roughly 150 miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan and 800 miles south of the Chinese mainland, Mischief Reef was occupied by Chinese forces in 1995. So far China has built two small buildings on the reef. A much larger base could allow the PLA to place naval, air and missile forces astride the Palawan Strait, one of the most important sea lanes in Asia. This would not just pose a new military threat to the Philippines, but it would increase China’s ability to constrict maritime commerce critical to the survival of U.S. allies like Japan and South Korea.
Call for New Construction on Mischief Reef
In its June 19, 2009 issue the Hong Kong Newspaper Ta Kung Pao reported on a speech given by the recently retired Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Staff Department of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Liberation Army, General Zhang Li, who called for the construction of naval and air facilities in the disputed territory known as Mischief Reef, in the South China Sea.[3] Zhang made his remarks in his capacity as a Member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC). General Zhang recommended that China respond strongly to a "very serious situation" in the South China Sea. He noted that of the 500 islets in the Nansha, or Spratly Island group, China only controlled four (reality is closer to nine), while Vietnam controlled 29, and the Philippines and Malaysia, four or more. Zhang also noted that China had no oil exploration platforms in the Nanshas, while other countries explore extensively.
To defend China’s interests General Zhang called for a three step program. First Zhang called for increasing the number of large ships and patrol aircraft for for the PLA Navy and other maritime police agencies to better enforce China’s South China Sea claims. He specifically called for the construction of 3,000 ton frigate-size ships for this mission. Second, General Zhang proposed building up a "Three-Dimensional Reconnaissance Observation System" for the South China Sea, as current capabilities are "quite backward." Third, he called for a greater investment in "infrastructure" such as ports and airfields, especially on Mischief Reef. Zhang notes, "This reef is quite suitable for building airports and ports, which can be used to control the entire Nansha [Spratly] region once they are built."[4] It is implied that the new airfields could extend the range of PLA J-10 and J-11 fighters, which are mentioned specifically.
General Zhang, Hu Jintao and the CPPCC
The possible level of support for General Zhang’s speech can be assessed from his invoking of higher Chinese leadership interest and from the perspective of Zhang’s previous and current position. Does Zhang’s speech represent a preview of future policy or perhaps a criticism of current policy? Zhang starts with a usual legitimization for his speech, invoking the interest of the top Chinese leadership. In this case Zhang cited the interest of Party and PLA Commander Hu Jintao. Zhang notes, "The Chinese Government pays high attention to planning and managing the South Sea, and Hu Jintao, who is the general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, Chinese president and Chairman of the Central Military Commission, also has given his opinions on planning well and managing the South Sea several times." While not an explicit endorsement for the steps then recommended by Zhang, such a specific statement should not be expected from Hu himself. It is known that Hu Jintao made a high profile visit to the new PLAN base near Sanya in first week of April 2008, ostensibly to inspect this base and to formally commission the PLA Navy’s new Type 071 landing platform dock (LPD) amphibious assault ship. This would constitute an indication that as General Zhang indicates, Hu is much aware of the issues confronting the PLA in the South China Sea.
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As for Zhang, he retired in January 2009 as a very senior PLA officer.[5] As early as 2000 he was a Lieutenant General serving as Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) of the General Staff Department of the Central Military Commission. He was promoted to full General in 2004, and retired as the third ranking member of the General Staff Department, and as the Deputy Secretary of the Commission For Discipline Inspection. As DCOS Zhang maintained a high public profile often meeting visiting foreign military delegations and traveling abroad. What is interesting is that most of Zhang’s PLA career was spent in the Engineering Corp, rising to the Director of the Engineering Corp Department of the General Staff Department from 1990-1991.[6] With this background, would General Zhang have played a major role in the PLA’s major infrastructure programs of the last decade, to include the new large underground submarine base at Sanya, or the construction of new island outposts in the Spratly Island chain? Would Zhang simply be advocating programs he pursued during the later part of his active career, or would he be reflecting a larger body of concern in the PLA that China needs to accelerate its military controls over the South China Sea?
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Nevertheless, it is not possible to fully assess whether General Zhang is advancing policies and plans already decided, or whether he instead represents a hard-line faction that is calling for bolder military actions in the South China Sea. The existence of Communist Party support beyond the PLA could be presumed from the fact that Zhang made his statements as a member of the top organ of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (CPPCC). Founded in 1949 the CPPCC was Mao Zedong’s early effort to build popular support for the Communist Party by assembling non-party groups. Today the CPPCC performs this same function, comparable to the rubber-stamp National People’s Congress. Currently the CPPCC is largely controlled by the United Front Works Department (UFWD)[7], so it is not a forum for wide-ranging debate. Consistent with the UFWD’s role of gathering support for the Party, Zhang’s speech was reprised in the Global Times[8], and widely circulated in the Chinese internet. However, given what the PLA is already doing to increase its capabilities in the South China Sea, it is necessary to take General Zhang’s speech as a serious warning of potential Chinese actions.
Parts of Zhang’s Program Underway
In recent years China has started doing much of what Zhang has called for. China has been expanding its non-PLA Navy maritime police forces with larger ships able to present a longer-range "civilian" capability to enforce Chinese sovereignty. In 2003 China’s Maritime Security Agency received its first 1,500ton "Haixun-21" class patrol ship. It is less well armed than PLA Navy frigates but carries a helicopter. A recent report that surfaced on a Chinese web page indicates that China may be planning to build a larger number of 1,000, 1,500 and 4,000ton ships for these sovereignty missions.[9] If true this report would indicate that China’s Coast Guard naval forces may feature ships the size of Japan’s larger Coast Guard ships. In mid-June 2009 the China Ocean Minerals Resources Agency started trials in the South China Sea of its modernized 5,600 ton Ocean One, purchased from the Ukraine in 1994.[10] This is perhaps China’s most modern ship for ocean sea-bed survey and mapping, and in the mid-1990s pioneered experimentation with China-Russia developed CR-01 deep sea unmanned underwater vehicle (UUVs) for survey missions.
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General Zhang called for the acquisition of more maritime patrol aircraft, and the above-cited report on the buildup of Coast Guard forces also noted this requirement. Today China’s maritime surveillance and PLA Navy Air Forces use a small number of small Y-12 twin-turboprop and medium size Y-8 4x-turboprop aircraft for this mission. They are inadequate in number and range to put China’s South China Sea claims under aerial surveillance. In the recent past China has been interested in purchasing or co-producing Russia’s modern Beriev Be-200 twin-turbofan powered amphibious aircraft. However, recent reports indicate that China has decided to develop the JL-600, or "Dragon-600," a concept large 4x-turboprop amphibian revealed at the November 2008 Zhuhai Airshow. It may fly as early as 2012.[11] While performance figures are not available, should it use the more powerful 6,500 shaft horsepower turboprops available for the new Shaanxi Y-9 transport, the JL-600 might be able to carry up to 15-20 tons of cargo, or similar to the Lockheed-Martin C-130. With the JL-600 the PLA could perform rapid direct logistic and personnel support missions to distant Spratly Island area outposts that are usually surrounded by shallow waters. The requirement for this capability would increase should China expand the size and personnel compliment of its Spratly outposts. The JL-600 could also perform long-range patrol, anti-submarine, anti-ship and mine-laying missions.
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General Zhang’s call for a "Three-Dimensional Reconnaissance Observation System " to provide "integrated" information is also a work in progress. The PLA is developing long-range Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar, sea-bed sonar systems, and surveillance satellites which could all contribute to an integrated battle space information network to defend areas of the South China Sea for future SSBN operations. In 2008 Asian military sources told the author that China had placed a new long range Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radar station in Hainan Island.[12] Then at the February 2009 IDEX show in Abu Dhabi a Russian source confirmed to the author the sale to China of the 300km range Podsolnukh-E surface-wave OTH radar.[13] But Russia also markets a 3,000km range sky-wave OTH system[14], though there is no reporting that this has also been sold to the PLA. China has also long been conducting research to develop sky-wave OTH radar[15]. In early 2008 an Asian military source also told the author that China had started laying initial undersea sonar arrays. Russia also markets these systems though there is no reporting they have been sold to China. Such sonar arrays would be especially useful for monitoring submarines. Some of the larger Paracel islands, like Woody Island, or in the future Mischief Reef, could be used to manage such arrays to help cordon off operating areas for PLA SSBNs.
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In addition, the PLA’s space surveillance network is well underway. The PLA is now building up to families of electro-optical and radar surveillance satellites. The Yaogan series now has about six satellites. The first two Huangjing HJ-1A and HJ-1B electro-optical satellites were launched in September 2008, and the first HJ-1C radar satellite is expected in 2009, with an eventual total of eight. When complete this constellation will allow for multiple daily passes over the South China Sea. Satellites will soon be joined by new unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for long-range surveillance. The Guizhou and Chengdu aircraft companies have revealed high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) UAV concepts. Guizhou’s box-wing 7,000km range "Soar Eagle" concept was revealed at the 2006 Zhuhai Airshow. Chengdu’s "Long Haul Eagle," revealed at the 2008 Zhuhai show, resembles the Northrop Grumman Global Hawk in shape and size. Chengdu’s smaller high-altitude medium-endurance Tian Yi turbofan powered surveillance UAV has just started flight testing.
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Mischief Reef
The third part of General Zhang’s agenda, an aggressive construction program in the Spratly Island chain, which does not yet appear to be underway. China has instead undertaken a gradual buildup of its facilities in this central-to-southern region of the South China Sea. After invading the Paracel Islands and taking them over from the former government of South Vietnam in 1974, Beijing waited until 1988 to undertake its next military move of capturing six islets and reefs in the Spratly Group, to include attacking some islets occupied by Vietnamese forces. Then in late 1994 and early 1995 Beijing stealthily occupied Mischief Reef. In all three instances China chose a period of pre-occupation or diversion by Washington or Moscow to move in the South China Sea.
In 1995 China only built stilt-mounted metal and wood platforms on Mischief Reef, but by 1998 these were replaced by a new concrete structure at the north end of the reef. However, by the 2004 to 2007 period it appears that the PLA engaged in some modest expansion of its facilities in the Spratlys. By 2006 one unidentified islet had been expanded to include a new tower with a covered dome, characteristic of a radar facility. Then in November 2007 satellite imagery obtained by the Jane’s Information Group showed that the Mischief Reef facilities had been expanded to include a new larger concrete building at the south end of the reef. This imagery also showed some activity to include a survey ship and other ships that may have been supporting construction activity.[16]
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In order to build an airstrip and port facilities as called for by General Zhang, the PLA would have to mount a far greater effort in Mischief reef. This effort will require a massive movement of rocks and concrete to create the necessary foundations for an airstrip, hangers, docks, plus storage and personnel buildings. The configuration of a final enlarged Mischief Reef base is not known, but that has not stopped imaginative Chinese from offering suggestions, as seen below.
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Should China build a major base on Mischief Reef, which as General Zhang suggests, should be able to handle PLA Chengdu J-10 and Shenyang J-11 multirole fighters, it would require an airstrip of about 1,000 meters.[17] A J-10 equipped with a thrust-vectored engine would be capable of shorter take-offs and landings, and an eventual PLA development of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) fighters[18] would significantly reduce airstrip requirements. With a 2,000m airstrip Mischief Reef could medium size transport aircraft or larger maritime patrol aircraft. This reef appears to be deep enough to accept small PLA Navy combatants up to corvette and minesweeper size, but may require significant dredging in order to build a pier that could accommodate larger warships. New construction to the extent of building a pier or airstrip would also enable the placement of a range of missiles, modern surface-to-air, cruise missiles or new long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles. In addition, if the reef could be dredged so that it could accommodate current or future PLA Navy air defense destroyers, these could provide long-range anti-aircraft and anti-ship cruise missiles.
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While it can be reasonably concluded that China is actually on a trajectory that would eventually follow General Zhang’s prescription of sharply militarizing China’s effort to control the South China Sea, it is not there yet. However, it is also reasonable to consider how a much larger base in Mischief Reef would aid the PLA. For one, in conjunction with the airbase that has existed on Woody Island in the northern Paracel Islands, a base on Mischief Reef would give the PLA military staging points at both ends of its South China Sea territorial claim area. They could serve as additional points for placing radar or managing undersea sensors that could vector PLA combat forces toward unwanted U.S. military or other Asian military forces. A larger base at Mischief Reef could also serve to assist naval and air surveillance of sea lanes down to and beyond the Malacca Strait. It would also be far easier for the PLA to mount rapid strikes against possible U.S. forces that would assist the Philippines, or to more easily close commercial sea lanes astride the Philippines with smaller minelayers and fast attack craft.
Price for U.S. Neutrality
While Washington cannot afford to police every corner of the Earth, it could have long ago decided that the South China Sea was important enough to make its interests known. The fact that South China Sea commercial waterways see the transit of about 80 percent of Japan’s petroleum should spur a major U.S. alliance interest.[19] The apparent Chinese intention to use the South China Sea as a "bastion" for future SSBN patrols, with their missile aimed primarily at the United States, should elevate the importance of this region as directly affecting the security of the U.S. homeland. However, the traditional U.S. position toward the disputed territorial claims of the South China Sea has been one of strict neutrality.[20] This policy was affirmed following the 1995 discovery of Chinese forces on Mischief Reef, though the Clinton Administration did make clear that it would honor alliance commitments to the Philippines if Chinese force were to attack Philippine military forces.
Washington could have made a major fuss over Mischief Reef in 1995 but it chose not to, and now it faces the possibility of a significant Chinese buildup a mere 150 miles off the coast of the Philippines. It is not likely that China will be persuaded by mere diplomatic measures to desist from building up Mischief Reef, or even vacating the reef. In the past Beijing has rejected the U.S. proposal for a formal "incidents at sea" agreement as the U.S. singed with the former Soviet Union. Instead China has insisted that U.S. Navy ships and submarines stay out of its "territory," which it increasingly justifies under the U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty. If China is successful in building larger military facilities in the Spratly Island group, and builds new air and naval forces to support them, then its interest in negotiating "rules" with Washington or even its patience with neighboring claimants to this region will further decline. Under such circumstances it is reasonable to expect a steady increase in "incidents" between U.S. and PLA naval forces and possible future Chinese attacks against Vietnamese, Philippine and possibly Taiwanese occupied islets in the Spratly group.
According to reports following the recent meeting by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michelle Flournoy and Deputy Chief of the General Staff Department General Ma Xiaotian, in July the U.S. and China will discuss a "new ‘set of principles’ to guide their relationship at sea."[21] Both sides may make nice, but it would be a mistake to ignore the fundamental interests each side brings to the table. Washington should press Beijing to reveal its nuclear intentions for the South China Sea and consider the path of nuclear weapons limitation agreements, a balance of strategic offense and defensive systems, verification and transparency as offering the best means for achieving a "stability" beneficial to both sides. Furthermore, the U.S. should warn China that a further militarization of the South China Sea, as called for by General Zhang Li, will force the U.S. to lead a regional response. It is indeed possible to avoid a repeat of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War completion at sea, but that will require that China reconsider fundamental attitudes toward nuclear weapons and to shelve its goals for military control of the greater South China Sea.
However, the U.S. should also be ready for a Chinese continuation of its nuclear and territorial goals for the South China Sea. Having failed to respond strongly enough in 1995, the U.S. may now be facing the prospect of a military base on Mischief Reef that may contribute to China’s ability to conduct nuclear war against the U.S. and its allies, and will enable the PLA to pose a direct threat to the Philippines and to the sea lanes of that region. This may mean that U.S. cannot cut back on its carrier battle groups, and their modernization, and may have to increase its number of attack submarines. Furthermore, Washington may have to increase naval cooperation with Japan, India and Australia, while looking for ways to increase conventional military cooperation with the Philippines.
[1] Andrew Scutro, "Sources: U.S. Navy Was Tracking Chinese Sub," Defense News, June 22, 2009, p. 3; the exact location of this incident has not been disclosed officially by the U.S., but Philippine government statements indicated it occurred near the Philippine and China-claimed Scarborough Shoals, see Malaya newspaper columnist Ellen Tordesillas, "No Sovereignty in its Own Territory," June 17, 2007, http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:TJnfkBD2YC0J:www.ellentordesillas.com/%3Fp%3D5895+No+sovereignty+in+own+territory&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us; this article also cited in Galrahn, "Observing the Scarborough Shoals PLAN Submarine Incident, Information Dissemination Blog Page, June 20, 2009, http://www.informationdissemination.net/2009/06/observing-scarborough-shoals-plan.html
[2] Thom Shanker, "China Harassed Ship, U.S. The Pentagon Says," The New York Times, March 10, 2008, p. 10.
[3] Wang Dejun, "China Needs To Seek Standing Point in Order to Plan, Manage South Sea; Expert Suggests Building Airports, Ports on Mischief Reef," Ta Kung Pao, June 19, 2009, Open Source Center translation.
[4] Ibid.
[5] "China’s top brass gets younger blood, navy ascendency prominent," Associated Press, April 6, 2009.
[6] "Zhang Li," China Vitae, http://www.chinavitae.org/biography/Zhang_Li%7C2218/career
[7] The author thanks Dr. June Teufel Dreyer for this information, communication with author, June 23, 2009.
[8] Li Hong Bo, "International experts recommend construction of an airport on Mischief Reef in the South China Sea," Global Times, June 19, 2009, http://mil.huanqiu.com/Observation/2009-06/492435.html; the Global Times article was widely posted on numerous Chinese web pages.
[9] "South China Sea Corps will increase large vessels and aircraft for monitoring," posted on the BBS.TIEXUE web site, June 17, 2009, http://bbs.tiexue.net/post2_3644647_1.html; This article was also copied onto the SinoDefense forum by "TP Huang," http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/navy/china-coast-guard-patrol-vessels-4068.html
[10] "Ocean One Sea Trials In the South China Sea," published on the FYJS Web Page, June 17, 2009, http://www.fyjs.cn/bbs/htm_data/25/0906/191825.html
[11] "China To Build World’s Largest Amphibious Aircraft," Xinhua, June 25, 2009, http://english.cri.cn/6909/2009/06/25/189s496326.htm
[12] Interview, April 2008.
[13] Interview, IDEX, Abu Dhabi, February 2009.
[14] "Over-The-Horizon Radar," in Anatoly Shevlyakov, Russia’s Arms 2006-2007, Moscow: Military Parade Publishers, 2006, p. 253-255.
[15] These abstract journal articles viewed on Chinese search engines indicate China’s research toward the development of combat Sky Wave over-the-horizon radar: Su Wei Min and Ni Jin Lin, "Guo Development Of Sky Wave Over-the-Horizon Radar," Aviation Journal, No.6, 2002; Guo Xin and Ni Jin Lin, "Ship Detection with Sky Wave over-the-Horizon Radar with Short Coherent Integration Time," Electronics and Information Journal, No.4, 2004; Kong Yong, Meng Xiangzhong, Wang Zhi and Qu Yongqing, "Combat Efficiency Evaluation for Sky Wave Over-the-Horizon Radar Based on ADC Modeling," Fire Control Radar Technology, No.3, 2005; Kong Yong, Wang Xiao Nian, Dai Cai Bin, Wang Zhi, "A Model for Evaluating Sky Wave Over-the-Horizon Radar Combat Efficiency," Equipment Command Institute of Technology Journal, No.1, 2006; Liang Yi and Wang Zhong, "Refraction effect in troposphere on OTH radar signal," Chengdu Institute of Information Engineering Journal, No.1,2007.
[16] This imagery is available and discussed in the author’s "Secret Sanya: China’s new nuclear naval base revealed," Jane’s Intelligence Review, May 2008.
[17] While the take-off distance for the Su-27SK is up to 800m, with a landing run of 620m, extra space would be required to allow for a margin of safety. Distance figures from Yefim Gordon, Sukhoi Su-27Flanker, Air Superiority Fighter, Shrewsbury: Airlife Publications, 1999, p. 147.
[18] The PLA interest in STOVL fighters is explored in the author’s "Update: China’s Aircraft Carriers," International Assessment and Strategy Center Web Page, March 10, 2009, http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.193/pub_detail.asp
[19] Japanese energy industry source, communication with author, June 21, 2009.
[20] The author recalls arguments with Pentagon officials in the mid-1980s about the insufficiency of U.S. neutrality toward the claims of the South China Sea. At the time these officials saw no U.S. interest in tilting toward allied claims and were not concerned that this region could become the locus of a major security threat to the United States.
[21] Cui Xiaohuo, "Encounters At Sea Set for ‘Game Rules,’ Chinese, U.S. militaries agree to talk again after ‘positive’ meeting," China Daily, June 25, 2009.
