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Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance?
Senior Fellow Douglas Farah's analysis of the debate over the level of threat posed by Iran's expanding diplomatic, trade and military presence in Latin America, and its stated ambition to continue to broaden these ties.
Chinese Naval Modernization: Altering the Balance of Power
Richard Fisher details China's naval modernization program and the potential impacts on U.S. interests in the Western Pacific.
The Dragon and the Raptor
The Washington Times
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A serious aerial confrontation between China and Taiwan that has been under way since mid-July serves to underscore America's need for the Lockheed/Martin F-22 Raptor next-generation air superiority fighter.
If the Asian-based U.S. air forces had the F-22 today, China would not have spent most of July and August trying to goad Taiwan's air force into combat. Such aggressive flying on the part of China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has not been seen in almost 40 years. Perhaps China felt so bold because the U.S. Air Force is stretched thin, from the Balkans to Iraq and Korea. In addition, the 70-plus USAF F-15C Eagles based in Okinawa are less impressive to a PLA air and missile strike force that is gaining strength every year.
It seems to be an article of faith among the F-22's many opponents that the Raptor will never face an adversary worthy of its promised capabilities, that could not be countered by a cheaper upgraded F-15 with better air-to-air missiles. These opponents would do well to assess China efforts to build a modern air force. China has devoted greater resources to this goal since it was shocked by the display of U.S. air power during the Gulf war.
However, many analysts of China's military tend to dismiss the PLAAF. This was the thrust of an oft-cited 1995 RAND Co. study of China's Air Force. RAND criticized the PLAAF's small number of modern fighters, lack of support aircraft, and its poor leadership, doctrine, training and logistics.
Apparently the PLAAF has taken its U.S. critics to heart. After buying 50 Russian Su-27 fighters in the early 1990s, in 1996 the Chinese signed a deal to co-produce 200 more. The Russians have bragged that in exercise engagements the Su-27 has proven to be more maneuverable than the F-15. China's Su-27s carry the Vympel R-73 helmet-sighted air-to-air missile, which allows the pilot to cue his missile by turning his head, rather than his whole aircraft. In short-range combat exercises R-73-equipped fighters have repeatedly defeated U.S. fighters not so equipped. The United States will not have a helmet-sighted missile for another three to four years.
At the 1997 Moscow Air Show Russian aircraft industry officials confided that China's new co-produced Su-27s would have better radar capable of handling multiple engagements with the medium-range Vympel R-77active-radar guided missile. This means China soon could have the ability to attack multiple aerial targets without having to "paint" the targets with the aircraft radar. U.S. fighters armed with the medium-range AIM-120 AMRAAM active-guided air-to-air missile have long had this capability. But not those of Taiwan. The U.S. State Department has repeatedly refused to sell the AIM-120 to Taiwan so that its new F-16s could handle multiple engagements.
In early June Chinese military officials stated they would buy 50 Su-30MKK attack fighters. Chinese officals have denied a report they would like to co-produce up to 250 more Su-30s, but they likely will purchase many more. Like the U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle the Su-30 is an all-weather strike-fighter capable of delivering precision guided bombs and missiles. Su-30s recently sold to India will eventually be equipped with new thrust-vectored engines that enable very high maneuverability, and a more powerful phased-array radar that vastly increases aerial attack and defense options. While the first prototype of the Su-30MKK is not so equipped, is at least possible that in the future China's Su-30s could carry many of the advanced accessories being sold to India.
On top of all this, China will soon begin production of its indigenous J-10 fighter that is reported to have received substantial help from Israel. Steeped in secrecy and speculation, the first alleged photo of the J-10 was recently released on the web. If the photo is accurate, this fighter will be a delta-wing canard about the same size as the European EF-2000 Typhoon. Russian and Israel are reported to have offered advanced radar and missile packages for the J-10. This fighter will also very likely arm China's first aircraft carrier. A 1996 Office of Naval Intelligence report estimated that the U.S. Navy's new F/A-18E/F fighter now entering production would be less maneuverable than the J-10.
As for critical support aircraft, both Russia and Israel are cooperating to build China a large AWACS that puts an Israeli radar on a Russian Il-76 transport. The British Racal Searchwater aerial radar is now being tested on a Chinese Y-8 transport aircraft. Both radar aircraft will be able to manage offensive and defense combat operations. China is building new electronic intelligence aircraft, and Russia is trying to sell China its Il-78 aerial refueling aircraft.
What remains to be seen is whether the PLAAF can meld its new weapon systems with new doctrine, tactics and training to perform all-weather offensive and defensive missions. But there are signs of progress. At China's largest air show in the city of Zhuhai last November it was revealed that China now has modern air combat training simulators. This is a major advance for the PLAAF that could help its development of modern combat doctrine and tactics.
And it must be underscored that China's main future strike weapons will be its emerging theater ballistic and cruise missile forces. If it comes to war, China intends to use massive missile strikes to destroy air forces on Taiwan, and if necessary, U.S. air forces in Okinawa.
To deter war in Asia, the United States has relied largely on deploying the most impressive military technology possible, especially air forces. It is irresponsible to develop combat aircraft that are less impressive in the face of China's continued military expansion. If the F-15's margin of superiority over the Su-27 is declining, does it make sense to build more?
The F-22's ability to supercruise - fly supersonic without using fuel-guzzling afterburners - remain highly maneuverable due to its vectored-thrust engines, and its advanced phased-array radar, will all convey the margin of superiority in the air that the United States will need in Asia. Yes, the F-22 is expensive, and it will require a new generation of long-range, active-guided missiles to remain ahead of the competition. And the Air Force will continue to require a range of support aircraft in order to ensure the success of fighter missions.
But even without the Raptor in U.S. service, China today feels bold enough to use its air forces to pressure Taiwan. Should China succeed in assembling a 300 to 500 Sukhoi air force in the next decade, the United States will need a far superior fighter to sustain deterrence without an expansion of deployed aircraft. One part of the solution for future deterrence on the Taiwan Strait will have to be U.S. combat aircraft that are unbeatable - as is promised by the F-22. If the Raptor falls, by 2005 the only vectored-thrust, phased-array radar and active-radar guided missile equipped fighter in East Asia could be in the Chinese Air Force.
