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What really lies ahead for Europe?

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by Arthur Waldron, Ph.D
Published on September 30th, 2004
LOOKING FORWARD

The “Europe” that periodically surfaces in the presidential campaign is really a foil, a creation of the American imagination—whether its governments are seen as ingrates, as in much of the Bush camp, or sophisticates, as with Kerry.

Here in the capital of Europe, Brussels, the newspapers for tend days have been dominated by a topic that fits neither American stereotype but that nevertheless better sums up Europe today—the “crise” (as the French press has it) or “crisis” with DHL, the high speed delivery service, now owned by the German post office, that is seeking an expansion of the number of night flights it is permitted at Brussels airport, now one of its major European hubs—and threatening to leave Brussels for Leipzig and Prague if their wishes are not granted.

Clearly we are not dealing with weltpolitik here: whether DHL goes or stays will have no effect whatsoever on Iraq, or Iran’s or Korea’s nuclear programs, or the Arab-Israeli conflict (or even that in Northern Ireland) nor will it have any impact at all on Washington’s relations with Europe. Yet it in Belgium it is driving every other story off the front pages and almost out of the newspaper—with long inside accounts of negotiations, backbiting, Walloon-Flemish slanging, etc.

This would be no more than a local curiosity were it not for the fact that every other European country is the same. The London papers are full of local news, so are the French (even Le Monde, on the ropes financially, has greatly cut back its formerly impressive foreign coverage).

The same is true for elections for the members of the European parliament. These are dominated not by pan-European issues, as one might expect, but rather by domestic questions, whose closest connection to Brussels is the financial issue of whether the country in question gives more or receives more from the European Union capital.

Americans must digest these facts, for what they mean is that, in spite of occasional speeches about global issues by Europeans, the historic Europe we have learned about, with its great powers and tradition of diplomacy, and the more recent Europe that seemed, as a member of NATO, engaged with us in issues beyond its frontiers, is no more.

Today’s Europe is deeply introverted, concerned above all with making the jerry-built European Union work, and somehow saving the quiet life of the welfare state from the bloody red capitalism that drives its Asian and American competitors. This is clearly a futile endeavor. Pleasant as life is now in states like France, with their massive social insurance schemes and subsidies to industries and agriculture, it is unsustainable—demographically, fiscally, politically. The realization of this fact, only now really dawning, is most unwelcome and will lead to vigorous, wasteful, and ultimately futile attempts to make it untrue.

Then there is national security, which, like social welfare, is about to become a problem. A glance at the map will indicate that dangerous countries along the southern rim of the Mediterranean and into the Middle East as far as Iran, not to mention unstable states of the former Soviet Union, are all geographically rather close to Europe (certainly closer than to the United States, whose problem European elites almost instinctively assume them to be). The continent is, or will soon be, within range of ballistic missiles belonging to a whole variety of those states. Yet realistic concern about security is not on the map.

EU borders are open to massive illegal immigration (a recent Belgian newspaper broke the shocking story of how high speed boats based at De Panne on the coast carry hundreds of illegal migrants to England). European cities are multi-racial and multi-cultural, with enough Muslims to provide cover for any Islamic terrorists who may chose to locate there. Yet no European country is capable of defending itself—against what is of course not clear—or of waging real war, without American assistance.

So rather than pretending to be angry with the Europeans (“liberty fries”) like many on the right, or imagining that a good dose of European diplomatic and military sophistication (such as that leading to World Wars I and II?) will set the United States right, as do many on the left, we should be asking, “what really lies ahead?”

The answer is, briefly, a long period during which Europe is almost entirely preoccupied by the attempt to reconstruct herself. This comes as a surprise: few expected the Cold War ever to end, but it did, and suddenly the European Union had twenty five members. How can it ever make decisions, let alone acquire some sort of genuine, heartfelt cohesion? A dinner party for twenty five people is, after all, too big if you are interested in serious conversation or getting to know people, A lengthy new constitution, authored by Mr Giscard d’Estaing, is supposed to explain how, but early evaluations suggest that it does not necessarily compare favorably to the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire. Nevertheless, the Europeans—their leaders at least—are committed to this project, which in the abstract makes very good sense, and they have already padlocked themselves into what is effectively a new gold standard for continental Europe in the form of the Euro.

Ironically, however, one result of the disappearance of the overarching imperatives of the Cold War is that in Europe, as in Asia and elsewhere, countries need one another less for security reasons, and are so more willing to dredge up persistent historical disputes. Of these Europe has no shortage, and as each one comes to life again, it is yet another handful of sand in the gears of the European Union..

Moreover, as yet few positive results, few of those “incremental benefits” so important to maintaining the forward momentum of any project, are evident to ordinary people living in the EU.. Quite the opposite. At a time when unemployment in French-speaking Belgium is at 14% and the European economy is scarcely growing, the redistributive and welfare policies of the original European Union, such as the Common Agricultural Policy of massive farm subsidies, look either about to be denied to the new members (Poland, for example) or to collapse, beyond anyone’s ability to finance, if they are in fact offered.

So the supreme constitutional challenge for the European Union is coming at a time when fundamental economic changes are eroding the ground of wealth upon which it was intended to stand.

Nor is this constitutional project supported, as was the American more than two centuries ago, by shared public opinion, even elite opinion, from the Atlantic (almost) to the Urals. National consciousness is refractory--strong, even growing; European consciousness is not.

And casting an enormous shadow from the eastern border is Turkey, that large, militarily powerful, and strategically important state that most Europeans would prefer not to embrace—particularly now that its usefulness as a barrier to the Soviet Union is no more.

So what is really going to happen, in perhaps the next dozen years? Here are some guesses:

First, we may expect introspection over the new European constitution and the nature of the federation to lead to internal controversy and political conflict having few implications for the United States. Setbacks, for example in European national referenda, will make things worse. But the project will not be abandoned. The European Union—already larger and more populous than the United Stateswill increasingly attempt to withdraw from the rest of the world until its own problems are solved.

But the world will not permit Europe to withdraw. For one thing, the global economy will relentlessly strain the accepted ways of doing business in Europe, with bankruptcies, unemployment, and unsuccessful attempts to maintain the welfare state. Frustration will lead to verbal hostility, some against the United States, but backed by nothing tangible. To this will be added frustrations as world power is redistricted, as it were, on the UN security council where, clearly, Europe is over represented.

At the same time, Europe will increasingly be forced to face security issues she has not faced since 1917 when, after the French army mutinies, Marshal Petain observed, with full Gallic realism, “il faut attendre les Americans” [“we must wait for the Americans”—or, as it turned out thirty years later, the Soviets as well].

But will the Americans come? After Iraq there will be no inclination and no obvious reason for the United States to play a leading role in maintaining security around the European periphery, something the Europeans are quite capable of doing themselves, if they put their minds and their wallets on it. Nor, I think, will American president for some time launch a preemptive war. We Americans are more likely to recognize the wisdom of an FDR, who bided and bided his time until finally we were attacked, or even a Wilson.

Nor, as it becomes clearer and clearer that Muslim militancy is ultimately aimed toward the elimination of corrupt, non-Muslim regimes and restoration of some sort of Islamic great power in the Eastern Mediterranean, such as existed from the days of the Prophet to the end of the Ottoman empire, and not at the United States per se, will it make sense for Washington to be the sole leader in the anti-terrorist struggle. In other words, in this area as well, Europe will no longer be able to count on security guaranteed, ultimately, by the United States.

Finally, expect some fireworks over Turkey. In about fifteen years she will have ended up either as a member of the EU, or not. Each outcome poses great challenges for Europe. Turkey is, after all, a serious military power, and will be next in line to go nuclear after Iran. Yet Europeans still remember the fall of Constantinople and the sieges of Vienna, or if they do not exactly, nevertheless harbor a very profound suspicion of the Turks which finds various rationalized explanations.

Europe today is a great civilization trying to find a modern political guise. In this it is like India, with its bold experiment in democratic confederation—far more advanced and successful so far than its European analogue—or China, with its many attempted leaps for real greatness, none yet successful.

Americans and Europeans still deeply share common beliefs in freedom, human rights, and human dignity, and few things would be better than for the trans-Atlantic alliance that Hitler created to be superseded by something built by people sharing those values. But this is not going to happen. Plenty of piecemeal cooperation will occur; bilateral relations with individual countries will fluctuate. We must neither underestimate nor overestimate Europe as she faces the unprecedented challenges, some of her own choosing, some forced upon her, of making European Union something real.

Arthur Waldron is the Lauder Professor of International Relations in the Department of History at the University of Pennsylvania, and Vice President and one of the founders of the International Assessment and Strategy Center. In this column he will present his thoughts and speculations on the longer term implications of today’s news—political, economic, social, environmental—depending upon where he is and what strikes his interest.

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