Publications
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Closer Look: Shenzhou-7’s Close Pass by the International Space Station
On September 27, 2008 during its 31st orbit, China’s Shenzhou-7 space mission achieved two of its main objectives: China’s first manned extra vehicular activity (EVA) or space walk, and the first launch of the 40kg BX-1 microsatellite for the purposes of testing new microsatellite technologies, and observing and operating in cooperation with the Shenzhou. The spacewalk by Chinese astronaut Zhai Zhigang received massive coverage in China and internationally and the microsatellite mission was also covered well by the Chinese media. What the Chinese media did not cover, and even more surprisingly has so far gone unremarked by the United States or Russian governments, was the fact that about 4 hours after launching the BX-1, the Shenzhou-7 flew to a distance of about 45km (27 miles) from the International Space Station (ISS).
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Post Olympic Prospects
Cleaning up after the party often reveals a lot, and the world situation post Beijing Olympics is no exception. Let’s start with China, not forgetting, however, that the unexpected Georgia crisis effectively drove the Olympic events out of the headlines. The story-board before the games began was essentially this: long humiliated and poor, China is announcing her return to the world stage in style, with the most lavish Olympics ever staged, featuring venues of the purest ultra-modern architecture, a multi media opening that will outshine anything seen before, the deployment for the first time of superb Chinese athletic talent garnering more gold medals than anyone, foreign heads of state making the trip who conspicuously had scheduling conflicts when it came to Athens--and lest anyone see it all as orchestrated or regimented, the whole package done up in the finest human rights rhetoric, with promises of full internet access and even an officially recognized right to protest.
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Nuclear Proliferation: The Next Wave
On May 11, 1998 India tested a thermonuclear bomb. A short while later I found myself in India discussing this and other events with the then Minister of Defense George Fernandes. The talking point from Washington was that India had done this to warn Pakistan. Fernandes was careful to refute this specifically telling me that the bomb was intended to deter China and that suitable delivery systems would follow. To drive the point home he stated that the Prime Minister had specifically authorized him to state that the Chinese threat and not Pakistan was driving the Indian nuclear and defense program, then just entering its current phase of impressive modernization.
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China’s Military Employment of American Dual-Use Technologies
On June 5, 1989 President George H.W. Bush announced the United States suspension of sales of items on the U.S. munitions list, or an arms embargo, in response to the June 3-4 Tiananmen Massacre in Beijing, China. In 1990 this policy was codified by the U.S. Congress. But almost from its inception successive American presidents have made exceptions to this law, primarily by issuing wavers to allow the purchase of Chinese satellite launch services. In addition, by the mid-1990s the U.S. Commerce Department has allowed a growing trade in so-called "dual-use" items that may have a military use but are not weapons in and of themselves.
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Foreign Aid and the Fight Against Terrorism and Proliferation: Leveraging Foreign Aid to Achieve U.S. Policy Goals
Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs There is growing recognition that there is no purely military solution in the fight against terrorism, whether the use of this tactic is driven by religion (radical Islamism), ideology and nationalism (Tamil Tigers), control of natural resources or “honey pots” (multipronged wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo, recent wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia) or a mixture of these elements (The FARC in Colombia, Taliban in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the janjaweed in Sudan). Our approach to combating terrorism, and the aid we give, is often limited by our confinement to dealing with individual states as entirely separate entities. But this is an increasingly unsustainable.
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Chinese Arms Cost American Lives
Far Eastern Economic Review (July/August 2008) For over a year, U.S. officials have been complaining to their Chinese counterparts about the shipment of Chinese-made or Chinese coproduced weapons to Iraqi insurgents and to the Taliban in Afghanistan, largely via Iran. The requests to stop the flow of arms into the hands of insurgents who are killing U.S. and coalition troops has fallen on deaf ears. Far more than just the latest irritant in U.S.-China relations, Beijing’s arming of these insurgencies fits into the long-term trend dating back to the Korean and Vietnam Wars of using proxy conflicts to bleed the American superpower.
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China's Naval Secrets
Asian Wall Street Journal Experts attempting to understand the strategic aims behind China's aggressive military expansion have generally focused on Taiwan. But a new naval base points at Beijing's significant and growing interest in projecting power into waters far from the Taiwan Strait. China, in fact, is equipping itself to assert its longstanding and expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea, and this plan could raise tensions well beyond the region.
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What Is Happening In China?
Posed at this time, the question is enormous. Washington is singularly ill-prepared to address it, for what is happening, bluntly speaking, is that the interlocking set of hopes and assumptions about China that for thirty years have ruled policy, is being tested as never before and may not survive.
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It Is Time for the Pentagon’s PLA Report to Grow Up
For the first time in many years, on March 3 the Pentagon issued its annual China Military Power report prior to the March 15 deadline called for by the 1997 Congressional authorization language. One apparent reason for the early delivery was to use the report as part of an intensified effort to convince China to relax its deeply ingrained resistance to “military transparency.” However, the key requirement for this annual report as mandated by the Congress was that the Department of Defense report “on the future pattern of military modernization of the People's Republic of China.” The 2008 report offers some interesting new data, even as it prompts new and old questions. Responding fully to its Congressional mandate and serving better to convince China to reveal more about its capabilities and intents will require more. The time has come to greatly expand and upgrade the China Military Power report.
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China’s Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control
Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Traditionally China did not recognize the concept of sovereignty, defined as the exclusive right to complete control over an area of governance or people. It functioned under principles more akin to what is known in the western world as suzerainty: a government that controls other governments but allows them considerable autonomy over their domestic affairs. Often the mechanism through which this was effected was the swearing of an oath of fealty from vassal to the feudal lord to whom allegiance would henceforth be due.
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| Total Records: 189 |
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